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South African law recognises a financial claim against a health provider for negligently failing to advise an expectant mother that she might 
give birth to a child suffering from a severe health condition or congenital disability. In December 2014, the Constitutional Court handed 
down a judgment that could lead to financial claims by the child, who was subsequently born with a severe health condition or disability. 
This judgment thus creates a framework to legally recognise a claim by a child whose current health condition was negligently misdiagnosed 
before birth. The contents and effects of the judgment are discussed in this article.
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Case report
A health provider who fails to advise a pregnant woman that her child 
could be born with a severe health condition or congenital disability 
could face financial liability in terms of South African (SA) law.[1,2] In 
the case of H v Fetal Assesment Centre,[3] a mother gave birth to a boy 
suffering from Down syndrome. She initiated a financial claim on behalf 
of the child against the Fetal Assesment Centre (FAC) in the High Court 
(HC) for failing to advise her of the risk that the child she was carrying 
could be born with this disorder. This is the so-called ‘wrongful life’ 
claim. The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) has defined a ‘wrongful 
life’ claim as ‘an action brought by a deformed child, who was born as a 
result of negligent diagnosis or other act by a doctor’ (in para 1).[4] The 
HC (in the FAC case) rejected the claim off-hand on the grounds that SA 
law does not recognise it. In terms of our current law, parents can claim 
for their financial loss suffered in these cases as a result of the additional 
costs of now caring for a child who has serious health challenges or 
disability. SA law thus limits the claim for monetary relief to the parent 
and does not extend the claim to the child once born. This legal position 
was confirmed and ultimately dead-ended by the SCA in the Stewart[5] 
case. The High Court in the FAC case was therefore bound by the SCA 
decision, which is why it rejected the child’s claim. The matter was 
appealed to the Constitutional Court (CC).
Findings and outcome
The CC found that the current approach to these cases was too narrow 
and paid little attention to constitutional values (para 23). It found that 
the issue in this type of case was ‘whether our constitutional values 
and rights should allow the child, in the circumstances of this case, 
to claim compensation for a life with disability’ (para 24). The court 
accepted that it was possible that upon further judicial investigation, 
such a claim might not be allowed in terms of our law but felt that the 
possibility of recognising the claim could not simply be regarded as a 
closed issue (para 24). It was further accepted that should the child’s 
claim be recognised, it would only come into existence once the child 
is born alive (para 50), similar to the approach for a claim in a case of 
prenatal physical injury.[6] The child claimant would also still have to 
show negligence on the part of the health provider (para 75). 
The CC considered how other countries responded to a child’s 
claim in such cases and looked at whether or not our law could 
accommodate the claim. It found that the child’s claim could exist in 
our law. The CC did not consider questions on the extent of expenses 
the child could claim for (para 77). The HC now has to reconsider 
the child’s potential claim following the CC’s decision (para 66). The 
CC found that all decisions in relation to this type of claim by a child 
will have to be done in accordance with constitutional principles and 
having regard to children’s rights, particularly the right to have their 
best interests considered as of paramount importance in these cases 
(paras 42, 49 and 69). The appeal was therefore successful to the 
extent that the CC decision gives the child a window of opportunity 
to raise a claim. 
Discussion 
Several times in the judgment, the CC made it clear that if the child’s 
claim was allowed it could be limited to the extent that the health 
provider was liable against either the parent or the child and not to 
both (para 70). The loss or harm suffered by the child relates to the 
fact that currently the child has no recognised claim if the parents for 
some reason failed to claim against the health provider. The child’s 
loss is rooted in the fact that in the absence of a claim by the parents, 
the health provider could avoid liability for medical misdiagnosis. 
What could be problematic with this approach is that that the child’s 
claim depends on the parents. The child is thus not viewed as an 
independent being. This appears contrary to what the CC held in S v. 
M,[7] where it said that: 
 ‘Every child has his or her own dignity. If a child is to 
be  constitutionally imagined as an individual with a distinctive 
personality, and not merely as a miniature adult waiting to reach 
full size, he or she cannot be treated as a mere extension of his 
or her parents, umbilical destined to sink or swim with them.’ 
(para 18)
The CC’s approach in the FAC case appears to be narrow. What would 
happen if the parents did claim but the claim was unsuccessful on 
technical grounds? Would it mean that the child would have to suffer 
under that loss and have no ability to reapproach the court to consider 
the substance of the claim against the health provider? 
The decision by the CC reopens the door to consider claims by 
a child in cases of prenatal misdiagnosis, which was basically a 
closed matter after the Stewart case. However, the CC could not 
make the final decision regarding the development of our common 
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law to allow for the child’s claim owing to a lack of evidence and 
therefore sent the case back to the HC (para 48). Despite this, the 
CC judgment gives guidance on how future courts should approach 
this matter. The CC judgment emphasised that courts faced 
with this issue must make their findings based on constitutional 
principles such as the best interests of the child. If we compare 
our constitutional principles and national laws against some of the 
countries noted in the CC judgment that recognise such claims 
(such as The Netherlands) (paras 44 and 45), it is clear that our 
legal system is more aligned with countries that do recognise 
the child’s claim given that our Constitution protects the rights 
of the child explicitly in section 28. It is therefore perhaps more 
likely than not that the ultimate decision in these cases will be 
to recognise the existence of the child’s separate claim in cases of 
medical misdiagnosis. The extent of the claim, the requirements for 
a successful claim and the potential remedies associated with the 
claim are matters that the courts will determine on a case-by-case 
basis. Any judicial inconsistencies arising from such cases could 
then again end before the CC for legal certainty on those issues. 
Conclusion
Although the CC’s consideration of the viability of a child’s 
claim was mostly theoretical in nature, it could come to the same 
conclusions should the issue find its way back to the CC in the 
future and the necessary evidence be produced. Therefore, courts 
such as the HC cannot simply ignore the CC’s analysis. These 
courts will find particular assistance from the CC’s judgment on 
how to limit the child’s claim if recognised. The child’s potential 
separate claim will ensure that health providers who negligently 
failed to advise parents of the possibility of giving birth to a child 
with serious health challenges or disability will not escape liability 
if parents failed to pursue a claim against the health provider. 
However, given the narrow approach of the CC to merge the child’s 
claim with that of the parent, the deterring effect of recognising 
the child’s claim might not be that significant because the health 
provider would still only be liable against a single claim. This is not 
very different to the current law. 
The significance of this judgment for health providers is thus 
twofold. In the first instance, currently the child’s claim is not 
recognised in our law so the health provider could escape liability 
if parents do not claim. This CC judgment does open the door to 
potential claims by a child in the event of a parent being unable to 
claim. Secondly, even if following the CC judgment the child’s claim 
is recognised, it might not be recognised as a separate claim from 
that of parents, and the health provider would be likely to be held 
liable for a single claim in the case of medical misdiagnosis. This 
case could thus spell the start of new developments in recognising 
a child’s claim in wrongful life cases. Health providers will have to 
wait and see how the law on this matter develops over time.
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